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Abstract: In this paper, a secure cross-layer–based routing technique (SCLARDI) for a mobile ad hoc network
(MANET) is proposed. This technique makes use of ad hoc on-demand routing protocol (AODV) algorithms and
honeypot technology to detect and isolate black hole attacks from MANETs. This novel system is compared with the
single-layer design techniques and existing cross-layer detection techniques. Out of the tested models, the proposed
cross-layer design is the most suitable for MANET security. First, the vulnerabilities of the AODV routing protocol
against black hole attacks are analyzed. Second, a secure cross-layer–based AODV routing technique is proposed. The
proposed SCLARDI technique detects and isolates black hole attacks from MANET. Finally, the results are compared
with the existing techniques. The simulations are done using NS-2. The simulation results show that the proposed
technique improves the packet delivery ratio and reduces network overhead, normalized routing load, and packet drop
ratio compared to other existing single-layer and cross-layer techniques.
Key words: Ad hoc on-demand routing protocol, black hole attacks, cross layer, mobile ad hoc network, packet delivery
ratio

1. Introduction
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) consists of dynamic, self-configuring, and self-deployable nodes, where
each node acts as a router. Unlike cellular or wired networks, MANETs do not require any base station or
centralized routers, due to their ad hoc nature. Initially, the routing protocols in MANET are not designed
to secure against malicious attackers. The routing protocol designers only consider routing between the nodes.
Routing algorithms used nowadays are not designed to handle attackers [1,2]. Protocol designers assume that
the MANET environment is trusted and cooperative; as a result, security is not considered [3,4]. In a MANET,
unlike a wired network, mobile nodes roam here and there. Thus, strictly layered architecture is not suﬃcient
to deal with the dynamics of a wireless network environment. MANET security cannot be solved by isolating a
single layer [5]. Hence, this paper uses a cross-layer security technique that enhances the network performance
of MANET by exchanging or sharing information between the layers [6–8]. Recently, a lot of new cross-layer
design techniques have been proposed to improve the performance of MANETs [9,10]. Before understanding
cross-layer design, the most vulnerable behavior of the black hole attack in an ad hoc on-demand (AODV)
routing protocol is discussed.
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1.1. Black hole attack in AODV
A black hole attack is a type of DoS attack. It is a severe threat against a routing protocol accomplished by
dropping packets. The AODV routing protocol suﬀers from various types of security problems. The main aim
of the black hole attack is to make the destination node unreachable or downgrade communication throughout
the network. The invisible act of black hole nodes can be detected by only monitoring the lost traﬃc. A black
hole attacker drops all the packets in a communication path. The AODV routing protocol is used in this paper
because it has a lot of vulnerabilities. Next, the importance of cross-layer design and security is discussed.

1.2. Cross-layer security
Cross-layer design exploits dependencies between the layers, which increases performance. Cross-layer design
shares knowledge about the state and conditions of one layer to the other layers. In cross-layer designs, not
all layers need to be coordinated or optimized jointly. In this work, the MAC and routing layer layers are
considered. In order to improve security, these two layers are considered with minimum features. If the features
are minimal, the network processing overhead is reduced. In addition to cross-layer security, a honeypot-based
security technique is also discussed in this work. A honeypot provides precise information with a very small
amount of data that contains malicious activity. Next, an overview of the honeypot security technique is
discussed.
1.3. Honeypot security
Spitzner defined a honeypot as a “security resource, whose value is probed, attacked or compromised.” A honeypot is a computing resource that is closely monitored in order to be intruded, attacked, or compromised. The
proposed secure cross-layer–based routing security solution (SCLARDI) includes a honeypot-based detection
and isolation technique for MANETs. Most existing black hole detection techniques use only single-layer detection techniques. However, an adversary may launch various types of attacks targeting multiple layers. Hence
in this paper, a cross-layer–based technique that uses the honeypot concept is discussed.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents related work in the areas of
honeypot security and cross-layer security. Section 3 describes the proposed SCLARDI methodology. Section 4
discusses the simulation results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.

2. Related work
Various authors have proposed security solutions to protect MANETs from attacks [11,12]. Honeypots are a
special type of mechanism for intrusion detection, designed to trap attackers and gather information about
them. Honeypots are used in cluster-based MANETs [13]. Physical-media–independent architecture [14] is
used to pass information to upper layers about changes at the network interface. In their proposed technique, a
mobile computer adapts itself dynamically. A set of device characteristics is defined and the interlayer signaling
pipe [15] is used to store cross-layer information in the wireless extension header.
A cross-layer technique is proposed in [16] to defend against black hole attacks in MANETs using CARDS.
It utilizes machine learning algorithms to defend against security problems in MANETs. Their technique consists
of three modules: data collection, data reduction, and learning. A shared database model [17] is proposed to
detect attacks in MANETs. They propose two types of architecture, Type I cross-layer IDS (CIDS) and Type
II CIDS.
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3. Proposed SCLARDI methodology
Figure 1 illustrates the proposed SCLARDI architecture for MANETs. The proposed SCLARDI architecture
consists of the following main components:

Figure 1. Proposed SCLARDI architecture.

1. Black hole detector/honeypot detector
2. Route lookup in cross layer
3.1. Black hole detector/honeypot detector
The honeypot detector module is responsible for detecting black hole nodes in the network. To begin with, the
honeypot detector initializes the malicious node detection process. First, it broadcasts spoofed RREQ packets.
The spoofed RREQ packets contain a nonexistent source ID and a TTL value set to 1. This RREQ packet
is known as a spoofed RREQ/honeypot detector packet. Then this spoofed RREQ packet is broadcasted to
all other nodes in the network. The broadcasted honeypot-spoofed RREQ packet waits for a reply from the
neighbor nodes. If any neighbors reply to this packet, those nodes are marked as black hole nodes in the routing
table. Normal nodes, which are not malicious, do not reply to this spoofed RREQ packet because the spoofed
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packets generated by the honeypot node contain a nonexistent source ID. Hence, the routing table updates this
black hole node information by marking it as a malicious node. The algorithm for the malicious node detection
timer function is given below. This function also invokes SendSpoofedRouteRequest(), which broadcasts the
spoofed RREQ messages to neighboring nodes in the network. This algorithm creates a nonexistent IP address
by checking the routing table entry and then adds the nonexistent routing address to the routing table. Then it
broadcasts the spoofed RREQ packet to all the nodes in the network. Additionally, it calls for another function,
which originally sends the fake request to all the nodes in the MANET. The following algorithm is responsible
for malicious node detection when the algorithm sends spoofed RREQ packets.
Algorithm for Malicious Node Detection
Input
Output

: Routing layer Data
: Malicious RREQ Data

Function : MaliciousNodeDetectionTimer ( )
Begin
SendSpoofedRouteRequest ();
End.
The above MaliciousNodeDetectionTimer() algorithm is used to send spoofed RREQ packets throughout the network. Since the above algorithm uses a recursive function, it invokes the following SendSpoofedRouteRequest() algorithm to send fake RREQ messages throughout the network.
Algorithm for sending spoofed RREQ
Function SendSpoofedRouteRequest ()
Begin
aodv rt entry *rt;
// Create a nonexisting IP address
NEAddress ← NonExistingNodeID;
Rt ← rtable.rt lookup (NEAddress);
if (rt == 0)
rt ← rtable.rt add (NEAddress);
SendFakeRequest (NEAddress);
End
The honeypot node assigns a nonexistent node ID to a particular network. Next, this new nonexistent
node ID is added to the routing table. The variable rt is used to assign the nonexistent node ID. By using this
nonexistent node ID, the spoofed packets are broadcasted throughout the network. The algorithm steps for
sending fake requests are given below:
3.2. Algorithm for sending fake requests
The below algorithm broadcasts a fake request. In an AODV RREQ packet, it fills the spoofed TTL value
and wrong node address. In this way, the fake RREQ packets are broadcasted throughout the network by the
honeypot node.
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Function SendFakeRequest (NEAddress)
Begin
// allocate a RREQ packet
SpoofedRREQ Packet Create Default RREQ Packet ()
// Fill out the RREQ packet with Spoofed Info
SpoofedRREQ Packet - > rq TTL = 1;
SpoofedRREQ Packet - > dst = NEAddress;
Broadcast (SpoofedRREQ Packet);
End

3.3. Modified route lookup in cross layer
Route lookup in the cross layer is responsible for dynamically invoking the detection process based on the
attack load. Whenever the attack load increases, the dynamic timer technique starts the detection process. The
following algorithm illustrates the dynamic timer algorithm that initiates the timer technique.
Algorithm
Input: Check Attack load data
Output: Invoke the timer based on the attack load
Function Timer ( )
Begin
if (EstimatedAttackLoad < = LoadStep)
EstimatedAttackLoad = Load Step
else
EstimatedAttackLoad = EstimatedAttackLoad + Load Step;
if (EstimatedAttackLoad > MaxAllowedLoad)
EstimatedAttackLoad = MaxAllowedLoad
else
EstimatedAttackLoad = EstimatedAttackLoad;
End
The above algorithm is responsible for detecting any attack load from the network. If the black hole
attack load is great, this algorithm invokes the detection process dynamically. Hence, the proposed technique
reduces the overhead of the network. Additionally, the cross-layer features used in this technique improve
network performance.
4. Performance evaluation
In order to evaluate this SCLARDI technique, various performance metrics were used. Packet delivery fraction
(PDF) is a useful metric for measuring how many packets are delivered from the source node to the destination
node. Normalized routing load (NRL) is used to measure the network load caused by control packets. End-toend delay (EED) is a useful metric for calculating the delay. Packet drop ratio is used to determine the causes
of packet loss in the network. Table 1 illustrates the simulation environment for the proposed technique. The
simulation environment, traﬃc parameters, and variable parameters were used for the SCLARDI technique.
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Table 1. Simulation environment.

Parameters
Channel type
Radio propagation model
Antenna type
Interface queue type
MAC type
Maximum packet in queue
Topographical area
Mobility scenario
Pause time
Mobility model

Values
Wireless channel
Two-ray ground model
Omni antenna
Drop Tail/Pri Queue
802.11
50
600 × 600 m2
10 m/s
20 s
Random waypoint model

The parameters in Table 2 were used as the traﬃc parameters. The parameters in Table 3 were used as
the variable parameters. For each set of parameters, the simulations were repeated 3 times and the average of
the results was calculated. The following experiments were conducted in order to demonstrate the improvement
of the proposed SCLARDI technique.
Table 2. Traﬃc parameters.

Parameters
Traﬃc agent
Transport agent
Traﬃc source
CBR rate

Values
CBR
UDP
7
10 kbps

Table 3. Variable parameters.

Parameters
Routing protocols
AODV with black holes
Number of nodes

Values
Normal AODV
1, 2, 3, and 4
20

a. Normal AODV
b. AODV without any detection and black hole attacks
c. AODV with the proposed SCLARDI technique
d. Comparison of the proposed technique with the existing techniques
The SCLARDI technique was compared with both the AODV and single-layer techniques. In each
comparison, the proposed SCLARDI technique performs considerably better than the existing AODV and
single-layer techniques. As seen in Table 4, the SCLARDI technique performed better than the other existing
techniques, where a comparison corresponding to PDF values when 40% of the network consists of malicious
nodes. In SCLARDI, the detection process is invoked dynamically by considering the attack load of the MANET.
PDF is 92.87% for the proposed SCLARDI technique when 10% of the network consists of black hole nodes.
The existing single-layer technique PDF is 89.03% and for AODV it is 67.73% under the same conditions. As
seen in Figure 2, the proposed SCLARDI technique drops 150 packets/s when 10% of the network consists
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of black hole nodes. The single-layer technique drops 229 packets/s and the existing AODV algorithm drops
590 packets/s under the same conditions, as shown in Figure 3. Hence the proposed SCLARDI technique
performs considerably better than the normal AODV and single-layer techniques. From Figure 4, the following
observations are made for NRL. In the proposed technique, NRL is measured in terms of kbps. Without a
detection technique, NRL increases slightly when 30% of the network consists of black hole nodes. After that,
NRL increases exponentially when the system uses no detection technique. The proposed detection technique

Figure 2. Comparison of the packet delivery fraction.

Figure 3. Comparison of dropped packets.

Figure 4. Comparison of the normalized routing load.
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Figure 5. Comparison of the end-to-end delay.

implements the SCLARDI technique, and hence there is a reduction in the NRL, as in Figure 4. Thus, the
NRL is reduced for the proposed SCLARDI technique. EED decreases when the percentage of malicious nodes
increases. In the proposed SCLARDI technique, EED decreases significantly, which indicates that the connection
is established within the lower number of hops, as shown in Figure 5. That is, when there is a malicious node in
the network, the proposed SCLARDI technique detects and isolates it from the network. Hence, communication
is only via the normal nodes and so EED is decreased. PDF is 92.87% for the proposed SCLARDI technique
when 10% of the network consists of black hole nodes. In the existing single-layer technique, PDF is 89.03%
and for AODV it is 67.73% under the same conditions. Hence the proposed SCLARDI technique performs
considerably better than the normal AODV and single-layer detection techniques. In the proposed SCLARDI
technique, EED decreases significantly, which indicates that the connection is established within the lower
number of hops. When there is a malicious node in the network, the proposed SCLARDI technique detects and
isolates it from the network. Hence, communication is only via the normal nodes and so EED is decreased. The
proposed cross-layer work is compared with the existing AODV technique, AODV protocol, and the single-layer
technique. The proposed cross layer technique improves the PDF compared to the other existing techniques, as
shown in Table 4.
Table 4. AODV with the proposed SCLARDI cross-layer technique.

Black hole node
1
2
3
4

PDF
92.87
75.23
66.73
51.67

NRL
0.43
0.70
0.82
1.11

EED
50.59
44.10
43.17
34.07

Routed packets
722.67
717.33
740.00
756.33

Dropped
150
387
297
601

5. Conclusion
In this paper, SCLARDI has been proposed. Extensive experimental investigations confirm that SCLARDI
is superior to the AODV and single-layer techniques. PDF is improved in the proposed SCLARDI technique
to 92.87%, which signifies an improvement in PDF. NRL is reduced in the proposed technique to 1.11 kbps,
while for the existing AODV protocol NRL is 110.79 kbps. This shows that the network overhead is reduced in
the proposed SCLARDI technique. EED is reduced to 50.59 s using the proposed SCLARDI technique. With
the SLBHAD technique, EED is 52.37 s and for the existing AODV technique it is 68.24 s. EED is reduced
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in the proposed SCLARDI technique. When 40% of the network consists of malicious black hole nodes, the
routed packets are increased to 756 packets/s. The results demonstrate that the proposed SCLARDI technique
improves PDF and routed packets, and reduces PDR, NRL, and EED.
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